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Strict Neutrality: 
The Next Step in First Amendment Development? 
PA UL]. WEBER 
University of Louisville 
In the world of Church-State scholarship writers are usually 
grouped into opposing camps called Absolute Separationists and Ac-
commodationists. Both groups attempt to interpret the First Amend-
ment religion clauses but draw radically different conclusions about 
what the First Amendment requires of us today. Those who espouse 
other positions are either ignored or, worse yet, accused of being closet 
separationists or accommodationists (depending on the perspective of 
the accuser) . Yet there is another position gaining ground . In the 25 
years since the concept of strict neutrality emerged success has come 
almost inadvertently. 1 The Supreme Court, without adopting the con-
cept of strict neutrality has begun to use the terminology of neutrality 
on occasion, and the major casebook in the field has the intriguing title, 
Toward Benevolent Neutrality, a term the authors conveniently leave 
undefined. 2 Unfortunately the term "neutrality" has almost as many 
meanings as the more generalized concept "separation." 
To understand the strict neutralist position it is helpful to begin with 
two presuppositions. (a) When the Founders wrote the First Amend-
ment they did not write with either the clairvoyance or the specificity 
that would make it easy to apply their principles to problems arising in 
contemporary church-state relations. There are various strands in the 
Founders thought which allow not only for conflicting interpretations 
but for contemporary adaptation. (b) We live almost two hundred 
years since the First Amendment Religion Clauses were penned and 
enormous changes have taken place, changes far beyond what the 
Founders could have imagined. 
Granted these presuppositions, the challenge in constitutional 
theorizing is to create a principle of interpretation which (1) remains 
as faithful as possible to the language of the Constitution and the intent 
of the Founders, (2) is realistic , i.e. , acknowledges political and 
economic reality and which (3) resolves problems in a manner seen as 
just, fair and required by the constitution. Before undertaking that 
challenge, further reflection on the presuppositions may be helpful. 
Varieties of Separation 
The term "separation of church and state " although never appear-
ing in the constitution , has become so enbedded in American con-
sciousness that it seems to sum up what is meant by the First Amend-
ment religion clauses . Small wonder . The term is so broad it can 
embrace a wide variety of beliefs and practices, and allows groups 
espousing any one of several policy agendas to wrap themselves in the 
mantle of the Constitution . Our first task is to sort out the divergent 
meanings of the term "separation" and determine which best meet the 
challenges of constitutional theorizing. 
Separation, in the First Amendment context , is a generic term 
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which has at least five distinct meanings. 3 The most fundamental is 
structural separation, and distinguishes most Western systems from 
such organic systems as exist in Iran, Saudi Arabia and other Muslim 
countries. The characteristics of structural separation are independent 
clerical and civil offices, separate organizations for government and 
religions, different personnel performing different functions, separate 
systems of law and independent ownership of property and the absence 
of any officially designated church or religion. Jefferson, Madison and 
most of the other Founders accepted the need for structural separa-
tion, and where they found remnants of organic relationships, as in 
parts of common law, they worked to remove them. It may be that this 
is as far as their thought had progressed at the time, although there are 
clues that they wanted something more. 
Absolute separation is a type vigorously pursued by some interest 
groups in this country. It is more of a financial separation than 
anything else, holding that no aid of any kind should flow from govern-
ment to religion or churches, and no financial support should flow from 
religion or churches to the government. Absolutists would take as nor-
mative Justice Black's description of the Establishment clause in Ever-
son v Board of Education. 
The "establishment of religion" clause of the first 
amendment means at least this: Neither a state nor the 
Federal Government can set up a church. Neither can 
pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or 
prefer one religion over another. Neither can force nor 
influence a person to go to or to remain away from 
church against his will or force him to profess a belief 
or disbelief in any religion. No person can be punished 
for entertaining or professing religious beliefs or 
disbeliefs, for church attendance or non-attendance. 
No tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to 
support any religious activities or institutions, 
whatever they may be called, or whatever form they 
may adopt to teach or practice religion. Neither a state 
nor the Federal Government can, openly or secretly, 
participate in the affairs of any religious organizations 
or groups and vice versa. In the words of Jefferson, 
the clause against establishment of religion by law was 
intended to erect "a wall of separation between Church 
and State." 4 
The difficulties facing the advocates of absolute separation are 
twofold. First, it is by no means clear that the Founders intended this 
specific a meaning of separation. 5 Second, historical practice in the 
United States, including contemporary practice, has included enor-
mous amounts of aid, both direct and indirect, flowing to religion from 
government in return for enormous amounts of mostly indirect aid 
from religion. 6 This is a political and economic reality absolutists may 
rally against, but it is so imbedded in law and practice that it is unlikely 
to change in the forseeable future. Absolutists are left in the awkward 
position of claiming as constitutional principle-a law to be 
obeyed-something that has never existed and is never likely to. Ab-
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solute separation is an ideal, not a reality. Unfortunately for ab-
solutists, the Constitution, unlike the Declaration of Independence, has 
the force of law and is meant to be obeyed as well as admired. 
Transvaluing separation is less understood in the United States, 
but does have a devoted following. It holds that one objective of 
government is to secularize the political culture of the nation, that is, to 
reject as politically illegitimate the use of all religious symbols, or the 
appeal to religious values, motivations or policy objectives in the 
political arena. Transvaluing separation would deny all aid to religious 
organizations under any circumstances. It is this type of separation 
that is touted in the Soviet constitution and law. 7 One statement from 
an American group that seems best to express this position is that of 
the American Humanist Association: 
To promote the "general welfare," a particular 
measure may be favored by church interests, and con-
sequently pressure and influence are brought to bear 
on the state's political machinery to assure its passage . 
Or a measure may be viewed with disfavor by the 
church with a resultant pressure on the state's political 
machinery to assure its defeat. This type of activity by 
the church harks back to pre-Revolutionary days both 
here and in Europe, where there was "cooperation" 
between government and church. But it was just that 
sort of religion-political interplay that the Founding 
Fathers tried desperately to prevent on American soil 
by adopting the First Amendment and the correspond-
ing state laws. 8 
Thomas Jefferson's desire to provide access to the University of 
Virginia for neighboring schools of divinity is prima facie evidence that 
he did not favor this type of separation. I have argued elsewhere that 
Madison 's Memorial and Remonstrance shows his opposition to this 
type separation. 9 In any event , the Supreme Court has never accepted 
transvaluing separation and it does not appear to have much promise 
as a constitutional principle in the United States. 
What has traditionally been called "accommodation" I would call 
Supportive Separation. Those who hold this position acknowledge the 
need for structural separation but would not drive the principle to the 
extremes of the absolute or transvaluing types . To the contrary , sup-
portive separationists favor aid and support for religion, holding only 
that government may not support one religion over another. This posi-
tion takes as normative Justice William 0 . Douglas' dictum that 
We are a religious people whose institutions 
presuppose a Supreme Being. We guarantee the 
freedom to worship as one chooses . We make room for 
as wide a variety of beliefs and creeds as the spiritual 
needs of man deem necessary. We sponsor an attitude 
on the part of government that shows no partiality to 
any one group and that lets each flourish according to 
the zeal of its adherents and the appeal of its dogma. 
When the state encourages religious instruction and 
cooperates with religious authorities by adjusting the 
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schedule of public events to sectarian needs, it follows 
the best of our traditions. For it then respects the 
religious nature of our people and accommodates the 
public service to their spiritual needs. 10 
Unfortunately for advocates of supportive separation the history 
of the battle for religious liberty in Virginia and of the framing of the 
First Amendment undermines any claim that this is what the Founders 
intended. In addition, a whole series of decisions indicates very clearly 
that the Supreme Court does not believe this is what the Constitution 
requires. Finally, there has been strong political opposition to such a 
position throughout American history. 
Equal Separation is that type which rejects all political or economic 
privilege, coercion or disability based on religious affiliation, belief or 
practice, or lack thereof, but guarantees to religiously motivated or af-
filiated individuals and organizations the same rights and privileges ex-
tended to other similarly situated individuals and organizations. It pro-
vides protection to religion without providing privilege. It treats the 
right to religious belief and practice as a human right to be protected 
along with other human rights in an evenhanded manner. It protects 
the right of religiously motivated groups and individuals to participate 
in the political process and the economic system in the same manner 
and to the same extent as it protects the rights of other similar groups 
and individuals to participate. 
A difficulty facing proponents of equal separation is that it is a con-
cept only recently developed and therefore unfamiliar to most 
Americans. It has been viewed suspiciously by advocates of other 
types of separation who fear that it will lead to a decrease in protection 
for religious liberty or an increase in aid to religion. Nonetheless it is 
the basis for the strict neutrality approach to the religion clauses and 
will be further developed below. It has been argued that equal separa-
tion is most consistent with the thought of James Madison. 11 
Historical Developments 
Several developments of enormous proportions have made it im-
possible to apply the First Amendment religion clauses to contem-
porary problems in any simplistic fashion and still meet the re-
quirements for constitutional theorizing posited above. 12 Due to space 
limitations these will simply be listed. The first development is the ap-
plication of the religion clauses to the states through the due process 
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by the Supreme Court. This is 
not something the Founders foresaw. 
A second unforeseen development is the transformation of both 
federal and state governments from passive-protective, minimalist 
governments to active-expansive, pervasive administrative 
bureaucracies. This change from a laissez-faire to a bureaucratic state 
with broad taxing, regulatory and spending powers has enormous im-
plications for church-state relations. 
Parallel to the expansion of government has been the expansion of 
religious organizations in population, physical institutions, activities 
undertaken and sheer variety of denominations, sects and cults. 
A fourth major change is the invention of technologies which make 
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possible such new activities as mass education, mass communication, 
massive impersonal solicitation of funds, the fabrication of mind alter-
ing drugs , and in the very near future , genetic manipulation . 
Finally , the sheer growth in population density, mobility and diver-
sity has profoundly altered the environment within which religious 
organizations and activities exist and the laws affecting them are 
made. Density and mobility are significant because it is no longer easy 
for individuals to live solely among their own kind or shelter their 
children from exposure to competing values. 
Taken together, these five developments since the First Amend-
ment was written pose such difficulties in terms of potential conflict, 
discrimination and entanglement that legal theories which ignore them 
are doomed to failure . The task of the original Founders was to protect 
religious liberty from government. The contemporary task is to protect 
religious liberty in the midst of government. The same is true for 
preventing establishment while not discriminating against religion. 
The Theory of Strict Neutrality 
Strict Neutrality was proposed a quarter century ago by Professor 
Philip Kurland of the University of Chicago: 
The thesis proposed here as the proper construc-
tion of the religion clauses of the first amendment is 
that the freedom and separation clauses should be 
read as a single precept that govenment cannot utilize 
religion as a standard for action or inaction because 
these clauses prohibit classification in terms of 
religion either to confer a benefit or to impose a 
burden. 13 
The thesis has been developed since then and some clarifications 
may be helpful. First, the purposes of the religion clauses can be 
summed up as freedom, separation , and equality . The application of 
the clauses in conjunction is both possible and necessary. It can be 
done by reading the clauses as an equal protection doctrine , or as 
Kurland explains: 
For if the command is that inhibitions not be placed 
by the state on religious activity, it is equally forbidden 
the state to confer favors upon religious activity. 
These commands would be impossible of effectuation 
unless they are read together as creating a doctrine 
more akin to the reading of the equal protection clause 
than to the due process clause , i.e. , they must be read 
to mean that religion may not be used as a basis for 
classification for purposes of government action, 
whether that action be the conferring of rights or 
privileges or the imposition of duties or obligations. 14 
The equal protection doctrine is a well developed component of 
constitutional law and can provide a firm foundation of dealing with 
current controversies in the church-state area, providing both con-
sistency and flexibility. Acceptance of strict neutrality is not a denial 
that religion can be used as a classification to identify a significant per-
sonal interest or social unit. It would be incongruous to hold that the 
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Constitution could recognize the existence of religion but that the 
government based on that Constitution could not. Recognition of an 
objective fact of personal value preference or of social organization 
would not be a violation of the neutrality principle. Examples might be 
recognition of the presence of a church or synagogue when planning 
traffic control signals or assigning personnel to expedite traffic. Such 
recognition implies that in relevant secular aspects individual religious 
interests and social groups are similar to other interests and groups, 
not based on religious content, but on the other public and secular 
aspects of a religion's social organization. Put in other words, strict 
neutrality is committed to the proposition that there is seldom a legally 
significant characteristic of religion so unique that it is not shared by 
similar nonreligious individuals and groups. The conclusion to be 
drawn is that in most aspects, religious individuals and interests are 
subject to the same laws as other similarly situated individuals and 
groups. 
But what happens when there is a claim based on a uniquely 
religious belief, e.g., when as Adventist cannot work on Saturday and 
requests unemployment compensation? Or a Mennonite refuses to 
have her picture on a driver's license? Or a Baptist church requires all 
its employees to be members of the church? Or what happens when a 
purportedly neutral law in fact imposes a significant burden on a 
religion or even prohibits a religious activity, e.g., an ordiance that pro-
hibits door to door solicitation on weekends? In such cases religion may 
be treated as a suspect classification subject to strict scrutiny by the 
courts. A suspect classification is one in which there is "a presumption 
of unconstitutionality against a law implying certain classifying 
traits." 15 If religion is considered a suspect classification, any statute 
utilizing religion or specifically impacting on religion is automatically 
suspect, will demand a very heavy burden of justification, and will be 
subject to the most rigid scrutiny. More than just a rational connection 
to a legitimate public purpose will be required. Nevertheless, if the 
standards of proof are met, the religious interest will be protected. 
The suspect classification concept is used most frequently to pro-
hibit racial and sexual discrimination, but it can equally well be used to 
preserve government neutrality in respect to religion. The question im-
mediately arises: what are the principles that justify such a classifica-
tion and define its limits? Professor Donald Giannella several years ago 
offered two such principles. The first is the principle of free exercise 
neutrality that "permits and sometimes requires the state to make 
special provision for religious interests in order to relieve them of both 
direct and indirect burdens placed on the free exercise of religion by in-
creased governmental regulation." 16 Such a provision is consonant 
with the "protected civil right" nature of religious liberty, but in 
accordance with the general neutralist position such provisions must 
be extended to other similar groups if there are any. 
The second principle is that of political neutrality. Its aim is "to 
assure that the establishment clause does not force the categorical ex-
clusion of religious activities and associations from a scheme of govern-
mental regulations whose secular purposes justify their inclusion. " 17 
Several examples might clarify the concept: If a local government is 
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distributing excess cheese and bread to the poor through neighborhood 
organizations, church groups could be neither given exclusive rights to 
distribute the foodstuffs nor excluded from doing so. If government 
rents neighborhood buildings as polling places, churches could be 
neither preferred nor excluded from participation. Obviously equal ac-
cess legislation fits within the strict neutrality concept . At the same 
time , if a church does participate in secular programs, under the 
neutrality principle it would have to keep the same records and main-
tain the same standards as other participants. 
Objections to the Strict Neutrality Principle 
A number of objections have been raised to the neutrality principle 
and we now turn to them. First is the objection that strict neutrality 
" guts " the religion clauses of any substantive meaning ; this objection 
argues that if religious groups , indi'viduals and interests are to be 
treated equally with others then the religion clauses are 
irrelevant-surely not a situation the Founders intended . 
It is true that very much of religious activity and all of religious 
thought are fully protected in the speech, press, and assembly clauses 
of the First Amendment, as well as by the due process and equal pro-
tection clauses, etc. Double protection serves no additional function . 
Unlike the speech, press and assembly clauses, however, the religion 
clauses are twofold , prohibiting the establishment of religion as well as 
guaranteeing its free exercise. The recognition of an independent liberty 
must be such that it offends neither one nor the other . Classification in 
terms of religion may tend to discriminate either by favoring religious 
interests at the expense of other similarly situated interests or by 
burdening religious interests in such a way as to have a "chilling 
effect" on religious liberty. The most equitable solution to this dilemma 
is to treat religipus groups and interests like similar groups and in-
terests . For example, a religious group seeking funds for its projects 
would have to conform to the same fundraising rules and accounting 
standards as other nonprofit groups. 
Precisely because religious liberty is an independent, substantive 
right, it functions as an indicator of the need to protect other groups 
and limit government intrusion into their affairs as well as into its own. 
Religious liberty is a protected legal right , but not a uniquely privileged 
one, that is, it gives no rights on the basis of religious commitment that 
do not extend equally to similar interests. In that sense it is a qualified 
legal right-qualified by the Establishment clause. 
A second objection holds that strict neutrality will limit religious 
liberty, that is, religious groups will be required to live under the same 
government regulations , abide by such things as affirmative action 
goals, file informational tax returns , etc . in the same manner as other 
not-for-profit organizations. That objection is partially valid, and 
designedly so. There is a cost to be borne for living in an organized 
society and while that cost is not borne equally under the neutrality 
principle , churches and other religious groups ought to be paying the 
same price and sharing the same burdens as other similar groups . If 
they do not , they are in a uniquely privileged position which is not 
something the Founders intended and which is a major objective of the 
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Establishment clause to avoid. Does this mean churches would have to 
pay truces under this principle? No, so long as other not-for-profit 
groups do not. 
There is another side to this. Bureaucracies can be burdensome; 
regulations can be unreasonable. Religious groups may often find 
themselves resisting government intrusions, opposing new regulations 
or reporting requirements, etc. Their input into the policy process is 
useful and healthy; churches can act as a brake on unnecessary govern-
ment expansion and protect not only religious interests but the in-
terests of others in society as well. Strict neutrality does not limit 
religious liberty; it only removes religious privilege. 
A third objection is that strict neutrality is only a smokescreen 
behind which to usher in massive aid to religious schools at the expense 
of the public schools. Several considerations are relevant. Religious 
schools seeking funds would need to conform to the same hiring, cer-
tification, accrediting, admissions and attendance standards, the same 
curriculum and textbook requirements and submit to inspections and 
oversight at the same level as other publically funded schools. This is 
not at all the Religious Right agenda or that of the parocial schools. 18 
Under such conditions there is unlikely to be a rush for funding. The 
real advantage, if there is one in this area, is to stimulate competition 
and innovation in education by groups willing to accept government 
regulations, a competition many public schools desperately need. 
A fourth objection is that acceptance of strict neutrality would 
undermine decades of court precedents and open the floodgates to a 
torrent of cases testing the limits of neutrality. The Suprene Court has 
increasingly been using the language of neutrality (although not con-
sistently) and many of its holdings are consistent with the principle. 
Acceptance would not, for example, undermine the three-pronged test 
for Establishment Clause cases, except that entanglement would need 
to be refined. 19 One advantage, if the principle were accepted, would 
be more consistently decided cases, a major dividend. 
A fifth objection is that "similarly situated" is a vague term 
fraught with potential conflict and abuse. Similar in what? How broad 
must the category be? Who gets to decide? One model is nonprofit 
organizations under the I.R.S. 501(c)3 category, which includes 
charitable, literary, recreational, fraternal, scientific, social and educa-
tional groups. The neutrality principle is built on the realization that in 
most legally significant dimensions religiously motivated individuals 
and groups are similar to their secular counterparts. Unfortunately the 
use of a strict neutrality principle will not do away with lawsuits, but 
testing the contours of similarity is precisely what Courts do best. 
The Values of Neutrality 
Having attempted to spell out and counter the major objections to 
strict neutrality, it may be appropriate to end with a brief list of the 
perceived values of adoption of such a principle. They appear to be the 
following: 
1. The integration of free exercise and nonestablishment clauses 
into a coherent, consistent, comprehensible principle which is faithful 
to the intentions of the Founders, responsive to contemporary constitu-
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tional values of due process and equal protection, cognizant of current 
political and economic realities, and defensible as a fair and equitable 
rule of law. 
2. Equal protection for nonreligious groups and individuals that 
are similar to religious groups and individuals. 
3. Establishment of a principled reason for bringing the secular 
components of religious activities into conformity with the standards 
and procedures required for other not-for-profit groups and activities. 
4. A stimulus for religious groups which currently seek to in-
fluence government policy to undertake protection of rights for society 
while they protect their own. 
Whether the Courts will accept a neutrality principle depends in 
large measure on whether it is understood, analyzed, critiqued, 
developed and ultimately accepted or rejected by the intellectual com-
munity which deals with church-state issues. For that to happen the 
principle must be given far more attention than it has yet received. 
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